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INTRODUCTION
The aim of this paper is twofold. The ¯rst one is theoretical and is related to recent
papers in the literature on matching models of the labour market which deal with skill
di®erences across workers and skill requirements across jobs.1 Our contribution in this area
is to allow for on-the-job-search in a model close in spirit to Albrecht and Vroman (2002)
(AV, henceforth) where low and high-educated workers can be hired for unskilled jobs while
only high-educated workers can perform skilled jobs. In particular, the introduction of
on-the-job search by high-educated workers who are employed in unskilled jobs gives rise
to new theoretical results regarding both between and within wage inequality and, most
importantly, crowding-out e®ects on the employability of low-educated workers in unskilled
jobs. This outcome motivates the second goal of our paper which is an empirical one and
draws upon the intense drive of upper education in Spain since the mid-eighties that, in
turn, has given rise to some of the phenomena that we try to replicate with our theoretical
model. Speci¯cally, as documented in Dolado et al: (2000), starting from one of the lowest
stocks of human capital in the OECD during the seventies (8% of the population aged 10-14
and 40% of those above 65 were illiterate), Spain has experienced a remarkable improvement
in the relative supply of highly educated workers as a result of the extension of compulsory
education to 16 years of age and the creation of many new (mostly) public and private
universities, the former with very low enrollment fees ¯nanced through general taxation.
Indeed, the number of undergraduates in Spanish universities is about 1.5 million in an total
population of 41 million, almost the same number as in Germany with a total population
which doubles the Spanish one.
This rapid educational upgrading has produced a number of e®ects which we try to
understand by means of a matching model which incorporates two types of workers and
two types of jobs where on-the-job-search is allowed to take place. In a market subject
to search frictions, high-educated workers may end up in unskilled jobs which they are
1See, inter alia, McKenna (1996), Acemoglu (1999), Gautier (1999), Mortensen and Pissarides (1999),
Albrecht and Vroman (2002) and Albrecht et al. (2002).
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willing to accept transitorily, as long as they pay a larger wage than their reservation wage.
This gives rise to an over-education phenomenon in the sense that workers' educational
attainments surpass the skill requirements of jobs. At the same time, they engage in an
on-the-job search for more adequate jobs to their educational attainments which a®ects
both the creation of either type of vacancy and the prospects of less-educated workers in
¯nding an unskilled job. To the extent that this process of on-the-job search leads to a
lower job-¯nding rate of less-skilled workers, despite the likely increase in the supply of
unskilled jobs when the high-skilled workers are willing to take them, it will give rise to a
crowding-out phenomenon.
Figure 1. Jobs' types, workers' types and °ows
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Figure 1 illustates the main di®erence between our model and AV with which it shares
several features. In both models, high-educated workers are allowed to search for both
skilled and unskilled jobs, low-educated workers can only be hired for unskilled jobs, search
is undirected and the distribution of workers' skills is taken to be exogenously given2. Thus,
2In recent works by Albrecht et al: (2002) and Bl¶azquez (2002), the investment on higher education is
endogeneously determined within a matching model with both heterogenous workers and jobs. However,
3
the mass of searchers in AV is formed by unemployed workers of either type. This implies
that there is a direct interaction between both types of workers so that less-educated workers
can bene¯t from an increase in the share of unskilled vacancies and viceversa. However,
in contrast to AV, we relax the assumption whereby high-educated workers get stuck in
unskilled jobs until they are destroyed. In particular, our alternative assumption is that
these mismatched workers can search as e±ciently for skilled jobs as unemployed workers.
This creates an additional mass of searchers that is depicted in the graph by the arrow from
unskilled jobs to skilled jobs, re°ecting the high-educated workers who move from unskilled
jobs to skilled jobs.
Our assumption of on-the-job search by mismatched workers can be seen as an alterna-
tive that lies somewhere in between of random search and perfectly directed search. Under
random search, wages and job characteristics play no allocative role whereas, under directed
search, workers can perfectly target jobs. In our set-up, high-educated workers will ratio-
nally accept unskilled jobs as long as the wage paid to them when performing those jobs is
above their outside option value, and they will subsequently stream onwards for better jobs.
As mentioned above, in AV's set-up high-educated workers either accept an unskilled job
and remain there until the job is destroyed, or they refuse the o®er, leading to two kinds
of equilibrium outcomes: one where both high and low-educated workers have unskilled
jobs (cross-skill matching) and another where high-educated workers only take skilled jobs
(ex-post segmentation). In this framework, one of the most interesting results in AV is that
there is a threshold value of the productivity in skilled jobs beyond which there will be a
shift from a cross-skill matching equilibrium to one with ex-post segmentation. By contrast,
allowing for on-the-job search as we do, implies that there will be more mismatch between
educational attainments and job requirements than in AV and that it will take much higher
values of such a productivity before moving to an ex-post segmentation regime.
Some other contrasting results between both models relate to AV's ¯nding that the
vacancy-unemplyoment ratio (tightness) is invariant to changes in the productivity of high-
insofar as the enrolment fees in Spanish universities are very low, we believe that the chosen assumption is
not too restrictive.
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educated workers in skilled jobs and in the proportion of high-educated individuals in the
population (in the cross-skill matching equilibrium regime). This is no longer the case in our
model once on-the-job search is allowed for. For example, skill-biased technical progress in-
creases tightness, since a higher productivity of high-educated workers increases the supply
of skilled jobs, and reduces the proportion of on-the-job search. Furthermore, the improved
sorting of workers gives ¯rms with an unskilled job a higher probability of ¯nding a stable
worker and given our assumption that both types of workers are equally productive on un-
skilled jobs, this increases the supply of unskilled vacancies as well. In contrast, in the case
of an increase in the proportion of high-education in the population, we obtain a decrease in
tightness as the increase in the number of skilled vacancies is more than o®set by a decrease
in the number of unskilled vacancies which form the majority of jobs that now face more
di±culties in attracting stable workers.
A second di®erence lies in the e®ect of an increase in the relative supply of high-educated
workers on their wages. Whereas in AV's model, it leads to a reduction in those wages, in
our model the demand e®ect induced by the larger supply of high-educated workers is even
larger, so that those wages increase.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model and discusses
the properties of the steady-state equilibrium in terms of its existence and uniqueness.
Section 3 summarises a few relevant stylised facts about the interaction between the educa-
tional drive and the working of the labour market in Spain. In light of those stylised facts,
Section 4 discusses a few simulations of the proposed model which serve to shed light on the
the Spanish experience. Finally, Section 5 draws some concluding remarks. The algebraic
details of the proof of existence and uniqueness are provided in an Appendix.
THE MODEL
Main assumptions
Consider an economy populated by a continuum of workers with measure normalised to
one. A share ¹ 2 (0; 1) of these workers is high-educated (H) while the remaining portion
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1 ¡ ¹ is low-educated (L). Moreover, all workers are risk neutral and in¯nitely-lived and
time is continuous.
There are two types of jobs: skilled jobs, denoted by S, and unskilled jobs denoted by U .
An unskilled jobs can be performed by both types of workers, while a skilled job requires a
high-educated worker. Furthermore, we assume that both types of workers have the same
productivity on an unskilled job. Formally, let yij denote the °ow output of a job of type
i 2 I = (S; U) that is ¯lled by a worker of type j 2 J = (H;L). Our assumptions on the
production technology can then be summarised as follows:
ySH > yUH = yUL > ySL = 0:
For convenience, ¯rms can open at most one job. The choice of the type of job is irreversible
and the mass of each type of job is determined by a free entry condition.
Finally, job destruction is completely exogeneous. A ¯lled job of type i is destroyed at
the Poisson rate ±i 2 R+ and we assume that ±U > ±S: Whenever a job is destroyed the
worker becomes unemployed while the job becomes vacant.
The labour market is characterised by matching frictions. Moreover, unlike AV we allow
for on-the-job search. Speci¯cally, the total number of matches between a worker and a
¯rm is determined by a constant returns to scale matching function
m(vU + vS; uL+ uH + eUH);
where uj is the mass of unemployed workers of type j, vi denotes the mass of vacancies
of each type of job and eUH is the mass of high educated workers in unskilled jobs. We
assume that m(:; :) is strictly increasing in both arguments and we denote the labour market
tightness by µ = (vU + vS)=(uL+ uH + eUH): Accordingly, the arrival rate of ¯rms is equal
to q(µ) = m(1; 1µ), but some skilled jobs will meet a worker who is not quali¯ed. Formally,
let aH denote the share of searching workers who are high-educated. The e®ective matching
rate of a skilled job is then aHq(µ). Similarly, the matching rate of workers is µq(µ), but
a low-educated worker cannot perform a skilled job. In what follows we denote the share
of vacant jobs that require a high-educated worker by bS: The e®ective matching rate of a
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low-educated worker is thus equal to (1 ¡ bS)µq(µ): Finally, the properties of the matching
function imply that the matching rate of workers (¯rms) is increasing (decreasing) in µ and
we assume
lim
µ!0 q(µ) = limµ!1µq(µ) = 1 and limµ!1 q(µ) = lim µq(µ) = 0:
Below we concentrate on the steady state equilibrium in which high-educated workers accept
both types of jobs and engage in on-the-job search. This cross-skill matching equilibrium
can be summarised by a vector fµ; bS; uL;uH ; eUHg and needs to satisfy the following condi-
tions: (i) match formation is voluntary (ii) the expected pro¯t of each type of job is equal to
zero (iii) the state variables uL;uH and eUH satisfy the appropriate steady state conditions.
These °ow equations will be derived in Section 2.3, but ¯rst we will derive the payo®s of
workers and ¯rms.
Wages and asset values
In the equilibrium of our interest there are three types of matches: high-educated workers on
skilled jobs, high-educated workers on unskilled jobs and low-educated workers on unskilled
jobs. In each of these matches, the ¯rm-worker pair divides the surplus of the match
according to the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution. The exogenous surplus share of
workers is denoted by ¯ 2 (0; 1). Moreover, we adopt the following notation: Uj denotes
the value of unemployment for a worker of type j, Vi denotes the value of a vacant job of
type i; Wij denotes the value of employment for a worker of type j on a job of type i and Jij
denotes the value to the ¯rm of ¯lling a job of type i with a worker of type j. Accordingly,
the surplus of a match between a job of type i and a worker of type j can be expressed
as Sij = Wij + Jij ¡ Vi ¡ Uj and the corresponding wage wij solves the Nash bargaining
condition:3
3Notice that the threat point of a worker is equal to the value of unemployment. We therefore exclude
the possibility that mismatched workers can use employment in an unskilled job to negotiate a higher wage
in a skilled job.
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Wij ¡Uj = ¯(Wij +Jij ¡ Vi ¡ Uj): (1)
We now continue with the derivation of the various asset value equations. Let r 2 R+
denote the common discount rate of ¯rms and workers and let zj denote the °ow income of
an unemployed worker of type j 2 J . The value of employment for a low-educated worker,
denoted by WUL; then satis¯ es:
rWUL = wUL ¡ ±U [WUL¡ UL] : (2)
Similarly, the expected lifetime income of a high-educated worker on a skilled job, WSH ,
satis¯ es:
rWSH = wSH ¡ ±S [WSH ¡ UH] (3)
The corresponding pro¯ts of the ¯rm are also easily derived. These values satisfy the
following standard asset value equations:
rJUL = yUL ¡wUL¡ ±U [JUL ¡ VU ] (4)
rJSH = ySH ¡ wSH ¡ ±S [JSH ¡ VS] : (5)
The asset value of a mismatched worker, i.e. a high-educated worker in an unskilled job,
is slightly more involved. Since these workers are engaged in on-the-job search, they will
quit their job at the Poisson rate µq(µ)bS ; incurring an income gain equal to WSH ¡ WUH :
Accordingly, the asset value of a mismatched worker, WUH ; satis¯es
rWUH = wUH ¡ ±U [WUH ¡ UH ] + µq(µ)bS [WSH ¡ WUH ] ; (6)
while the associated pro¯t of the ¯rm, JUH , satis¯ es:
rJUH = yUH ¡ wUH ¡ (µq(µ)bS + ±U ) [JUH ¡VU] : (7)
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Finally, in our cross-skill matching equilibrium the values of unemployment satisfy:
rUL = zL+ µq(µ)(1 ¡ bS) [WUL ¡UL] (8)
rUH = zH + µq(µ) [(1 ¡ bS )WUH + bSWSH ¡UH ] : (9)
According to (9), the expected income of a high-educated unemployed is a weighted average
of the expected income in skilled and unskilled jobs. Furthermore, in our economy, skilled
jobs are both more productive and more stable than unskilled jobs. Other things equal,
high-educated workers therefore bene¯t from an increase in bS. However, such a shift in the
composition of the pool of vacancies hurts low-educated workers as it lowers their exit rate
out of unemployment.
A similar logic applies to jobs. Let ci denotes the °ow cost of a vacant job of type i 2 I.
The value of a vacant job is then given by:
rVU = ¡cU + q(µ) [(1 ¡ aH)JUL + aHJUH ¡VU] (10)
rVS = ¡cS + q(µ)aH [JSH ¡ VS] : (11)
Thus, other things equal the pro¯ts of a skilled vacancy increase with aH, while the response
of VU to changes in aH will depend on the relative productivity of mismatched workers (see,
e.g. Gautier 2002). Nonetheless, since high-educated workers exit these jobs at a higher
rate than low-educated workers while both types of workers have the same productivity,
(yUH = yUL); this relationship will be a negative one in our economy.
To conclude this section we also report the solutions for the three di®erent wages wUL;
wUH and wSH . Substituting eqs. (2)-(11) into (1) and imposing Vi = 0 for 8 i 2 I yields:
wUL = rUL+ ¯(yUL ¡ rUL) (12)
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wSH = rUH +¯(ySH ¡ rUH) (13)
wUH = rUH +¯(yUH ¡ rUH) ¡ (1 ¡¯)µq(µ)b¯(ySH ¡ rUH)
r + ±S
: (14)
According to (12), low-educated workers obtain a share ¯ of the °ow surplus of their job.
The same is true for high educated workers who are matched to a skilled job. Mismatched
workers, on the contrary, receive less than ¯ of the °ow surplus yUH ¡ rUH as the ¯rm
appropriates a share (1¡¯) of the expected capital gain µq(µ)bS(WSH¡WUH) from succesful
on-the-job search.
EQUILIBRIUM
To solve for the cross-skill matching equilibrium with on-the-job search we need to ¯nd the
equilibrium values of the ¯ve endogeneous variables µ, bS, uL, uH and eUH : These values
are found using the free entry conditions for skilled and unskilled jobs plus the three °ow
equations for the state variables.
We start with a derivation of the free entry conditions. In a ¯rst step, we substitute the
wage equations into the expressions for JUL;JUH and JSH:
4
JUL = (1 ¡ ¯)
µ
yUL ¡ rUL
r + ±U
¶
(15)
JSH = (1 ¡ ¯)
µ
ySH ¡ rUH
r + ±S
¶
(16)
JUH = (1 ¡ ¯)
µ
yUH ¡ rUH
r + ±U + µq(µ)
+ µq(µ)bS¯
(ySH ¡ rUH)
r + ±S
¶
(17)
In each of these expressions the term between brackets denotes the value of the match
4The same solutions are obtained by substituting the asset values for Jij, Wij and Uj into the Nash
bargaining condition imposing the zero pro¯t condition Vi = 0 8 i 2 I.
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surplus. To obtain the reservation wage of workers we need to substitute these surplus
expressions into the value functions for UL and UH: Taking into account that a worker's
wage satis¯ es the Nash bargaining solution this yields
rUL =
(r + ±U)zL + µq(µ)(1 ¡ bS)¯yUL
r + ±U + µq(µ)(1 ¡ bS)¯ ; (18)
for the °ow income of an unemployed worker with low education and
rUH =
(r + ±U + µq(µ)bS)zH + µq(µ)(1 ¡ bS)¯yUH
r + ±U + µq(µ)(bS +(1 ¡ bS)¯) +
¯
1 ¡¯
µ
bS
aH
¶
cSµ; (19)
for the °ow income of unemployed workers with high education. When bS = 0 both expres-
sions take the same form. In contrast, when bS > 0; high-educated workers may end up in
a skilled job. The associated income gain µq(µ)bS¯SSH is captured by the second term on
the right hand side of (19).
Finally, substituting the reservation wages into (10) and (11), and imposing the condition
that VU = VS = 0; yields the following free entry conditions:
cU
q(µ)
= (1 ¡ ¯)
µ
(1 ¡aH)
µ
yUL ¡ zL
¸1
¶
+aH
µ
yUH ¡ zH
¸2
¶¶
(20)
cS
aHq(µ)
= (1 ¡ ¯)
µµ
ySH ¡ zH
¸3
¶
¡
µ
µq(µ)¯(1 ¡ bS)(yUH ¡ zH)
¸2¸3
¶¶
(21)
where
¸1 ´ r + ±U + µq(µ)(1 ¡ bS)¯
¸2 ´ r + ±U + µq(µ) [bS +(1 ¡ bS )¯]
¸3 ´ r + ±S + µq(µ)bS¯:
Equations (20) and (21) are our ¯rst two equilibrium conditions. The remaining equilib-
rium conditions follow from the steady state conditions for uL, uH and eUH . First of all,
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recognising that the mass of employed workers with low education is 1 ¡ ¹ ¡ uL, we can
express the steady state condition for uL as:
µq(µ)(1 ¡ bS)uL = ±U [1 ¡ ¹ ¡uL] (22)
On the left-hand side we have the mass of low-educated workers who ¯nd employment per
unit of time, while the term on the right measures the °ow into unemployment per unit of
time.
Similarly, since the mass of high-educated workers on skilled jobs is equal to ¹¡uH¡eUH ,
the steady state conditions for uH and eUH reduce to:
µq(µ)(1 ¡ bS)uH = [±U + µq(µ)bS]eUH (23)
µq(µ)bS[uH + eUH] = ±S[¹ ¡ uH ¡ eUH ] (24)
From (22) it follows immediately that uL is equal to:
uL =
±U
±U + µq(µ)(1 ¡ bS)(1 ¡ ¹): (25)
This equation shows that uL is positively related to ±U and bS, while the unemployment
rate of low-educated workers tends to decrease with µ:
Similarly, from (24), it follows that uH+eUH is given by ¹±S=(±S+µq(µ)bS) and, together
with (23), this implies that:
uH =
µq(µ)bS + ±U
µq(µ) + ±U
µ
±S
±S + µq(µ)bS
¶
¹ (26)
eUH =
µq(µ)(1 ¡ bS)
µq(µ)+ ±U
µ
±S
±S + µq(µ)bS
¶
¹: (27)
This completes our derivation of the equilibrium. The procedure to ¯nd the vector (µ, bS,
uL, uH, eUH) that solves equations (20),(21) and (25)-(27) is simple. In a ¯rst step we
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guess a value for aH ´ (uH + eUH)=(uL + uH + eUH) and solve (20) and (21) for (µ, bS):
Together with the °ow equations this yields a realisation for the remaining variables and
we repeat this procedure until the realisation of aH coincides with our initial guess. Finally,
in a last step we need to verify that the match surplus SUH is positive so that it is optimal
for high-educated workers to accept an unskilled job.
Existence and Uniqueness
This section brie°y discusses the conditions for existence and uniqueness of a cross-skill
matching equilibrium. The treatment is based on the analysis in AV (2002). As shown
by AV once it is ensured that ¯rms are willing to create skilled jobs, three equilibrium
con¯gurations may occur. First, if the fraction of low-educated workers, 1 ¡ ¹; is large
and the di®erence between yUH and ySH is small, it is worthwhile for an individual high-
educated worker to accept an unskilled job, even if all other high-educated were to reject
such jobs and there exists a unique cross-skill matching equilibrium. Conversely, if ¹ is
small and the di®erence between skill requirements is large, the opposite would happen and
the unique equilibrium is the ex-post segmentation one. Finally, for an intermediate range
of parameter values, the two pure-strategy equilibria may coexist.
The basic ¯nding of AV is that there are two loci representing the free-entry conditions
in the croos-skill matching equilibrium, denotes by VU(yUH) = 0 and Vs(ySH) = 0, re-
spectively. The ¯rst locus is upward sloping in the (µ;1 ¡ aH) plane whilst the second
locus is downward sloping in the same plane. Hence, the equilibrium is always unique.
Furthermore, in the absence of on-the-job search µ does not depend on either ¹ or ySH ;
implying that an increase in ySH shifts both loci upwards increasing 1 ¡aH ; yet leaving µ
unchanged. Additionally, increases in ySH eventually shift the cross-skill equilibrium to an
ex-post segmentation one.
By contrast, once on-the-job search is allowed for, the possibilty of having an ex-post seg-
mentation equlibrium decreases since now a higher value of ySH is needed to shift equlibria.
In the Appendix, we discuss in detail the circumstances under which the cross-skill equi-
13
librium remains as the valid one. In particular, we derive conditions under which VU and
VS share the same slopes as in AV's analysis in the (µ; 1 ¡ aH) plane. The strategy is to
prove that VU = VU(µ; aH) with ±VU=±µ < 0 and ±VU=±aH < 0; and that VS = VS (µ; aH)
with ±VS=±µ < 0 and ±VS=±aH > 0: For that, a su±cient condition is that the elasticity of
µq(µ) w.r.t. µ is larger than the elasticity of bS w.r.t. µ .Nonetheless, it is no longer the
case that ±µ=±¹ = ±µ=±ySH = 0: As it will be checked in the simulations and is depicted in
Figure 2, a rise of ySH shifts the VS = 0 locus to the right since, for a given value of aH ; µ
needs to increase to restore zero pro¯ts, while it shifts the VU = 0 locus to the left as the
increase in the number of skilled vacancies reduces aH for a given value of µ. In general,
the net e®ect on µ is ambiguous. However, in our simulations, the shift of VS is larger and
the overall labour market tightness µ increases. Likewise, an increase of ¹ moves the two
loci in a similar way but this time the shift in VU is larger and µ decreases.
Figure 2. Comparative statics of an increase in yhs
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A LOOK AT THE SPANISH LABOUR MARKET
As mentioned in the Introduction, one of the main motivations for our study is the
evolution of the Spanish youth labour market since the mid-eighties, following a remarkable
improvement in the supply of highly educated workers. An important characteristic of this
educational drive is the strong shift towards university / tertiary degrees. This process has
been documented in detail in other studies and is illustrated in Table 2, which presents a
cross-country comparison of the educational attainment of the population aged 25-64 in the
EU as of 1999.
Table 1. Educational Attainment by age groups in EU countries, 1999
A. Upper secondary education B. Tertiary Education
25-64 25-34/ 25-34/ 25-34/ 25-64 25-34/ 25-34/ 25-34/
35-44 45-54 55-64 35-44 45-54 55-64
Austria 75 1.1 1.1 1.4 8 0.9 1.3 1.9
Belgium 57 1.2 1.5 2,1 27 1.2 1.4 2.2
Denmark 79 1,1 1.1 1.3 26 1.0 1.0 1.5
Finland 71 1.0 1.3 1.9 31 1.1 1.3 1.8
France 61 1.2 1.4 1.9 21 1.4 1.7 2.6
Germany 76 1.0 1.1 1.2 22 0.8 0.9 1.1
Greece 47 1.2 1.8 3.1 17 1.2 1.8 3.1
Italy 42 1.1 1.5 2.7 9 0.9 1.0 1.8
Luxembourg 59 1.0 1.1 1.5 17 1.2 1.0 1.8
Netherlands 65 1.1 1.3 1.5 23 1.0 1.2 1.5
Portugal 19 1.5 2.1 3.9 9 1.3 1.5 2.7
Spain 33 1.3 2.1 3.9 15 1.4 1.9 3.4
Sweden 77 1.1 1.2 1.4 28 1.1 1.1 1.5
UK 69 1.1 1.3 1.9 24 1.0 1.1 1.8
EU 63 1.1 1.2 1.5 20 1.0 1.2 1.6
Source: OECD (Education at the Glance, 2001)
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As it can be observed, Spain has one of the largest shares of the population with at most
upper secondary education (67%) and the fraction of the population with higher education
is about 75% of the EU average. Nonetheless, the remaining columns in parts A and B of
Table 1 indicate that, when comparing the relative educational attainments of cohorts aged
25-34 and 55-64, the proportion of people who just completed upper secondary (tertiary)
education in the former cohort is 3.9 (3.4) times higher than in the second cohort and 1.3
(1.4) times higher than in the 35-44 age bracket. A comparison of those ratios with other
EU countries shows that Spain has undergone a more intense educational drive than the
remaining countries.
As Dolado et al: (2000) have pointed out, this striking evolution of the supply of high-
educated workers has not seemingly been matched by an equal increase in the supply of
skilled vacancies. Moreover, this seems to have given rise to an over-education phenomenon,
in the sense that high-educated workers who work in unskilled jobs tend to have the follow-
ing characteristics. First, over-educated workers tend to earn less than identically educated
workers in skilled jobs and no more than low-educated workers in unskilled jobs. Sec-
ond, they tend to have higher rates of ¯rm and occupational mobility tending to move to
higher-level occupations as a result of exerting on-the-job search. And, third, there is some
evidence in favour of crowding-out, in the sense that high-educated workers take jobs away
from low-educated ones. The ¯rst two characteristics have been tested by Galindo-Rueda
(2001) using a subsample of males with attained tertiary education, in the age bracket 20-
65, extracted from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) for the 1994-1996
period5. This dataset contains information on the individual¶s perception of mismatch be-
tween his educational attainments and the skills required in the particular job he or she
performs. He ¯nds some favourable evidence for higher upward mobility by over-educated
workers and a strong evidence, even after correcting for sample-selection problems, in favour
5Further evidence stating that returns to higher education has declined over the early nineties can be
found in Alba-R¶amirez (1993), where it is estimated that 17% of high-educated workers are over-educated.
As for evidence in other countries, Muysken and Ter-Weel (1998) and Gautier et al. (2002) discuss the
Dutch case.
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of over-education leading to lower individual¶s earnings. Further indirect evidence can be
found in Bover et al. (2002) where, in a study about the (log) earnings distribution of
workers in Spain during the eighties, it is found that the ratio between the 75th and 25th
percentiles of workers with tertiary education increased by 8%, whilst the corresponding
ratio for lower-educated workers hardly changed.
The third characteristic is illustrated in Figure 3. This graph is borrowed from Dolado et
al. (2000) and it depicts the occupational structure of the so-called \entry-jobs" by attained
educational degree, that is, the type of job that youth workers take after completing a given
educational degree. For that purpose, four age groups and four educational levels have
been chosen so that we can analyse the evolution over time of the kind of job that young
workers were occupying up to four years after they ¯nished a given degree. Thus, the 16-
20 cohort corresponds to upper secondary education and 23-27 to a university degree. The
entry-jobs have been classi¯ed in increasing order of \complexity": Professional/Technicians
(P1), Teaching Professionals and Employees in Public Administration (P2), Clerical and
Administratives (P3), Manual Craft and Operators (P4), and Sales Elementary and Hotel &
Restaurants Occupations, Unskilled Services and Labourers (P5). The solid lines represent
the proportion of wage earners with a given age and degree who work in a given entry-
occupation whereas the dotted line plots the share of each occupation in employment.
The lesson to be drawn from this Figure is that the more educated workers seem to be
increasingly ¯lling both high-skill jobs (P1) and semi-skill ones (P3), at the expense of a
drastic reduction in P2. At the same time, low-educated workers have been \crowded out"
from their tradional entry jobs (P3) towards very unskilled jobs (P5).
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Figure 3. Entry jobs by age and educational attainments
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Figure 3 (continued)
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A further indication of the crowding-out of low-educated workers can be obtained by
looking at the evolution of the unemployment rates for low and high-educated workers. As
is well known, Spain has had since the mid-eighties one of the higher, if not the highest,
unemployment rates in the OECD (varying from 20% in 1985 to 12% nowadays, reaching
a peak of 24% in 1994). Moreover, both the unemployment rates of low and high-educated
workers have been high (the former moved from 34% in 1985 to 21% in 2000 whereas the
latter fell from 20% in 1985 to 13% in 2000). However, that raw comparison does not control
for previous job experience. There is strong evidence that, besides education, job experience
is a key screening device used by ¯rms when making hiring decisions and that the role of the
latter has increased as the over-education phenomenon has spread out (seeF¶ern¶andez, 2002).
Indeed, once job experience is controlled for, it is found that, while the unemployment rate of
low-educated workers has increased since the early eighties, the unemployment rate of high-
educated workers has decreased. This is illustrated in Figure 4 where the unemployment
rates of low-educated workers (those with lower secondary education) in the age cohort
16-20 are compared with the unemployment rates of high-educated workers (those with a
university 1st. degree) in the age cohort 21-25 in 1980, 1990 and 2000 for male and female
workers. As it can be observed, there is an upward trend in the former rate whereas there
is a downward trend in the latter.
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Figure 4. Unemployment rates by age and educational attainment
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The above evidence seems to suggest that the skill upgrading of the Spanish labour force
and the increased willingness of high-educated workers to take unskilled jobs had a negative
e®ect on the employment opportunities of low-skilled workers. Moreover, in the case of
Spain, this process seems to aggravated by institutional factors, namely the widespread use
of temporary jobs (mostly ¯xed-term contracts subject to low or no severance payments)
since the mid-eighties. The rate of incidence of employment under those contracts (share
in total salaried employment) reached 33% in the early nineties and has remained resilient
eversince. An overall assessment of the implications of the generalised use of those contracts
for the working of the Spanish labour market can be found in Dolado et al.(2002). Insofar,
as most of those temporary jobs were of low quality, we can interpret their larger availability
as a reduction in the cost of opening unskilled vacancies.6 Accordingly, in section 5 we will
simulate the joint e®ect of an increase in both the share of high-educated workers (¹) in
6Note that we miss the e®ect of the temporary-contract reform on job separation which, however, is taken
to be three times larger for unskilled than for skilled jobs in the simulations. We choose this simpler roye
because we wish to concentrate on on-the-job search.
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the population and/or in their productivity (ySH), and the increase in the use of temporary
contracts, the latter being captured by a reduction in the °ow cost of keeping un¯lled an
unskilled vacancy (cU):
SIMULATIONS AND COMPARATIVE STATICS
In this section we perform a few simulations with the model. Our aim is to examine the
comparative statics of themodel following a change in some of the model¶s parameters which
try to mimic the e®ects on the endogenous variables of: (i) an increase in the proportion of
high-educated workers in the economy (¹); capturing the educational drive, (ii) an increase
in the productivity of high-educated workers in skilled jobs (ySH), representing the e®ects
of skill-biased technical change, and (iii) a reduction in the °ow cost of keeping un¯lled an
unskilled vacancy, re°ecting the lower cost of creating unskilled vacancies brought about by
the introduction of temporary jobs.
The model is calibrated using a standard Cobb-Douglas matching function, m = 12 (vU +
vS)1=2(uL + uH + eSH)1=2; together with the following parameter con¯guration: ¯ = 0:5
(i.e. the Hosios' value), r = 0:05, cS = 1:0; cU = 0:5, yUL = yUH = 1 (equal productivity in
unskilled jobs), ySH = 2:0; ±S = 0:1, ±U = 0:3; zL = 0:25, zH = 0:25 and ¹ = 0:1: Thus, in
the baseline version of the model, the proportion of educated workers is 10% of the (unit
mass) population.
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Table 2. Comparative Statics for separate changes in ¹;yHS and cU
Baseline ¹ = 0:3 yHS = 3 cU = 0:35
µ 0.799 0.791 0.967 1.070
bS 0.124 0.301 0.178 0.101
aH 0.177 0.258 0.136 0.206euL 0.161 0.194 0.156 0.139euH 0.077 0.063 0.061 0.069eUH 0.233 0.094 0.158 0.254
wSH 1.621 1.741 2.458 1.622
wUH 0.842 0.780 0.825 0.859
wUL 0.884 0.865 0.886 0.897
The solution for the baseline model is reported in column 1 of Table 2, yielding un-
employment rates for low and high-educated workers (euL and euH) of 16.1.% and 7.7%,
respectively, and a proportion (eUH) of 23.3% of high-educated workers engaged in on-the-
job search while working in unskilled jobs7. The share of skilled vacancies in total vacancies
(bS) is 12.4% and the proportion of high-educated workers in the pool of searchers (aH)
is 17.7%. Further the three wages are: 1.621 (wSH) for high-educated workers in skilled
jobs, 0.842 (wSH) for the same workers in unskilled jobs, and 0.884 (wUL) for low-educated
workers in unskilled jobs. Note that, in contrast to the result in AV -where, under the
assumption that low and high-educated workers are equally productive in unskilled jobs,
the latter get a higher wage than the former due to their higher outside option value- we
get an opposite result. The intuition for our result is that the negative e®ect of on-the-job
search on the match surplus and on the wage of mismatched workers outweighs the posi-
tive e®ect on the reservation wage.8 Had we allowed for yUH > yUL; then we could have
obtained that wSH ¸ wSL: However, we prefer to keep the chosen baseline speci¯cation to
7Note that euL (= uL=(uL + eUL) ) and euH (= uH =(uH + eUH + eSH) ) are rates and not masses. The
same applies to eUH and eSH :
8By comparing equations (12) and (14) it can be checked that wUL > wUH;with yUL = yUH ; i®
µq(µ)bS (ySH ¡ rUH)=(r+±S) > r(UH ¡ UL):
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highlight the di®erences between our model and AV¶s. As for wages, we will pay attention
in what follows to the so-called \within-group" wage inequality ( henceforth, within) given
by the di®erence between the wages of high-educated workers in skilled jobs (wSH) and the
one received by those workers in unskilled jobs (wUH): This di®erential is a good proxy for
the penalty to over-education. Finally, the equilibrium value of µ is 0:8 which implies an
admittedly high unemployment duration of 21 months but this is not too far away from the
average duration of unemployment in Spain in the mid-eighties, around 15 months, where,
with an overall unemployment rate of about 20%, strong hysteresis has been present (see
Dolado and Jimeno, 1998).
In column 2, results are reported for the case where the proportion of high-educated
people in the population (¹) increases from 0.1 to 0.3. In constrast to AV, where µ is
una®ected by changes in ¹, we ¯nd that µ falls slightly from 0.8 to 0.79. This reduction
occurs despite the increase in the supply of skilled vacancies (bS rises from 12.4% to 30.1%)
and the decrease in the share of mismatched workers (eUH falls from 23.3% to 9.4%) and
is due to the increase in aH from 17.7% to 25.8%. Under our assumption that yUH =
yUL; this shift in the composition of the pool of searchers towards high-educated workers
exerts a negative e®ect on VU leading to a fall in the supply of unskilled jobs and to
a reduction in the overall labour market tightness.9 Finally, notice that wSH increases
whereas wUH and wUL decrease, with a particularly large reduction in the former wage.
Thus, for the parameter con¯guration chosen here, an increase in the proportion of high-
educated individuals gives rise to an increase in the unemployment rate of low-educated
workers, yet it reduces both the unemployment rate of high-educated workers and the share
of on-the-job searchers.10 Moreover, we observe an increase in the \within" wage di®erential
for high-educated workers.
Column 3 displays the results stemming from an increase in ySH from 2.0 in the baseline
9Notice that the negative e®ect on µ cannot be explained by a pure compositional e®ect. In the baseline
model, the costs of both types of vacant job are proportional to output. As a result, a shift in the job
distribution towards skilled jobs cannot cause a fall in µ unless the supply of unskilled jobs falls.
10This result is somewhat similar to the one obtained by Shimer (2001) who observes that an increase in
the cohort size improves labour market performance and reduces unemployment.
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model to 3.0. This time, again in contrast to AV¶s results where µ is invariant to changes
in ySH , µ increases strongly to 0.967. Furthermore, the increase in bS implies that the
higher productivity of high-educated workers leads to a larger creation of skilled vacancies
which are now more attractive to ¯rms. This of course leads to a lower euH (from 7.7%
to 6.1%) and a to much smaller proportion of on-the-job searchers (from 23.3% to 15.8%).
However, interestingly enough, the improved sorting of the two types of workers also gives
rise to a decrease in euL as ¯rms with an unskilled job ¯nd it easier to locate a low-educated
worker (i.e. aH falls from 17.7% to 13.6%). With regard to wages, naturally wSH increases
whereas wUH experiences a small reduction and wUL remains basically the same. Summing
up, an increase in the productivity of high-educated workers leads to a reduction in the
unemployment rate of both types of workers, albeit much larger for high-educated workers,
a fall in the proportion of on-the-job searchers and a larger within wage gap.
Column 4 presents the results from reducing cU from 0.5 to 0.35. Since it is now cheaper
to create unskilled vacancies, µ increases to 1.070 whilst bS decreases. As a result, the
proportion of on-the-job searchers increases from 23.3% to 25.4% and euH falls slightly from
7.7% to 6.9% while euL falls by more than 2 percentage points from 16.1% to 13.9 %. As
regards wages, wSH remains unaltered whereas wUH and wUL slightly increase so that the
\within" wage wap decreases. Hence, a reduction in the °ow cost of keeping an unskilled
vacancy un¯lled reduces both unemployment rates, increases the proportion of on-the-job
searchers and reduces the \within" wage inequality.
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Table 3. Comparative Statics for joint changes in ¹;yHS and cU
Baseline (yHS ^ ¹) (yHS ^ cU ) (cU ^ ¹) (yHS ^ cU ^ ¹)a (yHS ^ cU ^ ¹)b
µ 0.799 1.019 1.322 1.003 1.321 1.093
bS 0.124 0.366 0.148 0.259 0.317 0.131
aH 0.177 0.212 0.159 0.292 0.243 0.211euL 0.161 0.190 0.133 0.168 0.160 0.169euH 0.077 0.053 0.056 0.057 0.048 0.064eUH 0.233 0.066 0.171 0.104 0.073 0.242
wSH 1.621 2.643 2.459 1.743 2.645 1.749
wSL 0.842 0.764 0.845 0.798 0.783 0.847
wUL 0.884 0.867 0.901 0.687 0.661 0.886
Note: (a) ¹=0.3,yHS=3.0 andcU=0.35; (b)¹=0.15,yHS=2.25 andcU=0.35.
Next, Table 3 reports the results of combining the joint e®ects of : (i) an increase in
ySH and ¹ (column 2);(ii) an increase in ySH and a reduction in cU (column 3), and (iii)
an increase in ¹ and a reduction in cU (column 4), and (iv) an increase in ySH and in ¹
and a reduction in cU (column 5): Column 1 reproduces for convenience the results for the
baseline model and column 6 displays the results fron a di®erent parameter con¯guration to
be discussed at the end of this section. The joint e®ect of skill-biased tecnical progress ("ySH
) and the educational drive (" ¹) imply both higher values of µ and bS; re°ecting the larger
availability of more productive high-educated workers. There is a decrease in euH since both
e®ects separately work in the same direction whereas euL increases since the unfavourable
e®ect of a rise in ¹ overcomes the favourable e®ect of the rise in ySH . The proportion of
on-the-job searchers strongly decreases again as result of the compound separate e®ects.
Within wage inequality increases since there is a strong rise of wSH accompanied by a
strong reduction in wUH and a mild one in wUL: The joint e®ect of skill-biased technical
progress and the reform facilitating the use of temporary jobs (#cU) leads to: a strong rise
in µ and a mild rise in bS; a reduction in both euH and euL;a fall in the proportion of on-the-
job searchers and an increase in the within wage gap although both wUL and wUH raise.
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The joint e®ect of the educational drive and the reform on temporary jobs gives rise to an
increase in µ, a reduction in euH and an increase in euL re°ecting a stronger unfavourable
e®ect from the increase in ¹ than the favorable e®ect of the decease in cU : Likewise, there is a
strong reduction in eHU stemming from the stronger e®ect of the increase in ¹: Within wage
inequality raises with the increase in wSH and a strong reduction in wUH and, particularly,
in wUL: Finally, the joint e®ect of the three changes taking place simultaneously point out
to results fairly similar to the discussed in column 2 of Table 3, except that now there is a
large reduction in wUH and wUL re°ecting the fact the negative e®ects of the joint increase
in ¹ and the reduction in cU seem to dominate the behaviour of wages in the unskilled jobs.
In sum, it can be concluded that in order to replicate the Spanish experience, the upper-
education lift cannot explain the stylised facts by itself since, despite increasing the un-
employment rate of low-educated workers and reducing the unemployment rate of high-
educated workers, the proportion of on-the-job searchers falls. Likewise, skill-biased tech-
nical progress reduces both unemployment rates and the share of on-the-job searchers. The
only change which increases that share is a reduction in the °ow cost of opening unskilled
vacancies (our proxy for the widespread use of temporary jobs). However, in a such a case,
both unemployment rates decrease again. Thus, it seems that the joint e®ects of a raise in
¹ and a reduction in cU are key ingredients (plus an increase in yHS which undoubtedly
has taken place) in explaining the Spanish experience. For illustrative purposes, we present
in column 6 of Table 3 the results of a simulation where cU is set at 0.35 whereas yHS
only increases to 2.25 and ¹ raises to 0.1511. As it can be observed, now both the un-
employment rate of low-skilled workers and the proportion of on-the-job searchers increase
whereas the unemployment rate of high-educated workers decreases so that the direction of
the comparative-statics e®ects somewhat reproduces the Spanish experience.
11There is evidence that the increase in productivity in Spain during the nineties has been lower than in
the average EU country, due to poor R&D policies, low adoption of IT technologies and the e®ect of some
labour market institutions (see Estrada and L¶opez-Salido, 2001, and Dolado et al., 2002).
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CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have analysed the properties of a matching model with two types of
workers (low and high-educated) and two types of jobs (unskilled and skilled) where on-
the-job searchby mismatched workers is allowed. We show that this model can account for
some of the stylised facts of the Spanish labour market following a large tertiary edicational
upgrading which has been taking place since the mid-eighties.
The model could be extended in a number of ways. One extention is to endogeneise the
skill distribution by allowing workers to invest in education. A second extension would be
to consider a model of directed search. In that environment workers can target their search
to di®erent types of jobs but nonetheless high-educated may consciously decide to apply
for unskilled jobs (with some probability). Finally, one could consider the possibility of
allowing for multiple meetings so that the model can address issues of ranking of applicants
by ¯rms.
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APPENDIX
In this Appendix we discuss issues related to the existence and uniqueness of the cross-
skill matching equilibrium. The treatment is based on the analysis of AV (2002).
For existence, we ¯rst need to rule out the corner solution in which ¯rms only supply
unskilled jobs. Next, we need to ensure that skilled workers accept unskilled vacancies,
namely, that the the ex post segregation equilibrium does not exist.
Existence
Homogeneous jobs.|
The corner solution with a homogeneous supply of unskilled jobs can be summarised by
a pair (µ¤; u¤) that solves:
cU
q(µ¤)
= (1 ¡¯)
µ
(1 ¡¹)(yUL ¡ zL) + ¹(yUH ¡ zH)
r + ±U + µ
¤q(µ¤)¯
¶
(28)
µ¤q(µ¤)u¤ = ±U(1 ¡u¤) (29)
The above free-entry condition follows immediately from the substitution of the reservation
wages
rUj =
(r + ±U )zj + µq(µ)¯yUj
r + ± + µq(µ)¯
(30)
into the job creation condition
cU
q(µ)
= (1 ¡ ¯)
µ
(1 ¡¹)
µ
yUL ¡ rUL
r + ±U
¶
+ ¹
µ
yUH ¡ zH
r + ±U
¶¶
(31)
where we have used the result that aH = ¹ since both types of workers have the same exit
rate out of unemployment.
Moreover, it is easy to show that the equilibrium with unskilled jobs is (i) always unique
and (ii) invariant to changes in ¹ if zL = zH :
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The second result follows from (28) by setting zH equal to zL: The uniqueness result
is also straightforward. Inspection of (28) shows that the left-hand side de¯nes a strictly
increasing and continuous function F : (0; 1) ! (0; 1), while the right-hand side de¯nes a
function G : (0;1) !
³
0; (1 ¡¯)((1¡¹)(yUL¡zL)+¹(yUH¡zH )r+±U
´
that is strictly descreasing om
the entire domain as @µq(µ)=@µ > 0. The two curves associated with F and G therefore
intersect exactly once.
What is more important for our purposes is that an equilibrium with unskilled jobs can
be ruled out by imposing the condition that
cS
q(µ¤)
< (1 ¡¯)
µ
ySH ¡ zH
r + ± + µ¤q(µ¤)¯
¶
¹ (32)
Given (32), a ¯rm can pro¯tably open a skilled job at (µ; bS ) = (µ
¤;0) even though it faces
a lower arrival rate ¹q(µ¤): Henceforth we shall assume that condition (32) is satis¯ ed.
Inspection of (32) shows that this is more likely at higher values of ySH and ¹ and lower
values of zH:
Ex-post segmentation.|
In an ex-post segmentation equilibrium skilled workers refuse unskilled jobs and continue
to search until they ¯nd a skilled job. In order for this strategy to be optimal, it must be
true that yUH ¡ rUH < 0, where the reservation wage rU corresponds to the reservation
value in the ex post segmentation case.
That is,
rUH = zH + µq(µ)bS¯
µ
ySH ¡ rUH
r + ±S
¶
; (33)
while the reservation wage of unskilled workers is unchanged at
rUL = zL + µq(µ)(1 ¡ bS)¯
µ
yUL ¡ rUL
r + ±U
¶
: (34)
Moreover, with ex post segmentation the free entry conditions are given by:
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cS
q(µ)
= (1 ¡ ¯)aH
µ
ySH ¡ rUH
r + ±S
¶
(35)
cN
q(µ)
= (1 ¡ ¯)(1 ¡ aH)
µ
yUL¡ rUL
r + ±U
¶
: (36)
Solving (35)-(36) for the outside option values of workers and substituting these values
into the entry conditions gives the following pair of equilibrium conditions:
cS
q(µ)
= (1 ¡¯)aH
µ
ySH ¡ zH
r + s + µq(µ)bS¯
¶
(37)
cU
q(µ)
= (1 ¡¯)(1 ¡ aH)
µ
yUL ¡ zL
r + s + µq(µ)(1 ¡ bS)¯
¶
(38)
where
rUH =
(r + ±S)zH + µq(µ)bS¯ySH
r + ±S + µq(µ)bS¯
(39)
rUH =
(r + ±U )zL + µq(µ)(1 ¡ bS)¯yUL
r + ±U + µq(µ)(1 ¡ bS)¯ (40)
An ex post segmentation equilibrium can then be summarised by a vector fµ; bS; uL; uHg
that solves (37) and (38) and that satis¯es the °ow equations for uL and uH :
(1 ¡ bS)µq(µ)(1 ¡aH)u = ±U (1 ¡ ¹ ¡ (1 ¡aH)u) ; (41)
bSµq(µ)aHu = ±S (¹ ¡ aHu); (42)
where u = uH + uL is the total mass of unemployed workers.
Uniqueness.|
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As in AV (2002) we can show that the ex post segmentation equilibrium is always
unique.12 The way to obtain this result is to reduce the entry equations into expressions in
terms of (µ;1 ¡aH): In a ¯rst step solve (41) for the share of unskilled vacancies:
(1 ¡ bS) = ±U (1 ¡¹ ¡ (1 ¡aH)u)
µq(µ)(1 ¡ aH)u : (43)
The value of u can be solved from (42).
u =
±S¹
[bSµq(µ) + ±S] aH
: (44)
Substituting this solution into (43) and rearranging terms yields:
1 ¡ bS = ±U (1 ¡ ¹)µq(µ)aH + ±U±S (1 ¡¹ ¡ (1 ¡ aH))
µq(µ) [±S¹(1 ¡aH) + ±UaH(1 ¡ ¹)] : (45)
Equation (45) expresses 1¡bS as a function of µ and aH . Di®erentiating the above condition
shows that
±bS
±aH
< 0: (46)
Moreover, by multiplying both sides of (45) we can also show that
±µq(µ)(1 ¡ bS)
±µ
> 0 (47)
±µq(µ)bS
±µ
> 0: (48)
Given the above results, it is easy to show that the expected pro¯ts of a skilled job increase
with aH (as a higher value of aH is associated with a lower value of bS). Similarly, the
expected pro¯t of an unskilled job, VU; increases with 1 ¡ aH , the share of low-educated
workers in the pool of unemployed. Since @VU=@µ and @VS=@µ are both negative, the free
12The only di®erence with their case is that we allow for values of zj and ±i that di®er across workers and
¯rms.
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entry conditions for unskilled jobs is therefore associated with a curve that slopes upward
in (µ;1 ¡ aH) space, while the curve associated to (37), the free entry condition for skilled
jobs, slopes downward in the space (µ;1 ¡aH):
Thus, whenever an ex post segmentation equilibrium exists it is unique. Furthermore,
from the condition that yUH ¡ rUH < 0 and our solution for rUH , it follows that an ex post
segmentation equilibrium is more likely at high values of ySH and ¹. In other words, our
cross-skill matching equilibrium corresponds to intermediate values of (ySH, ¹) at which
¯rms ¯nd it pro¯table to create skilled jobs while high-educated workers do not ¯nd in their
interest to refuse unskilled jobs.
Uniqueness in cross-skill matching.|
The results of the ex- post separation equilibrium can also be used to analyse the cross-
skill matching equilibrium. Notice that the three °ow equations of the cross-skill matching
eq. can be rewritten as:
(1 ¡ bS)µq(µ)(1 ¡aH)u = ±U (1 ¡ ¹ ¡ (1 ¡ aH)u)
bSµq(µ)aHu = ±S (¹ ¡ aHu)
(1 ¡ bS)µq(µ)aH»u = aH(1 ¡ »)u[±U + µq(µ)bS]
where u ´ uL+uH + eUH denotes the total mass of searching workers while » ´ uH=(uH +
eUH):
A comparison with the ex-post separation equilibrium shows that the ¯rst two °ow equa-
tions are identical. As a result, we can derive the same solution for 1 ¡ aH plus the same
relation between changes in aH and bS . The only di®erence is that we need to replace u
by u to account for the mass of workers who search on-the-job.
Nonetheless, this is not su±cient to obtain the equivalent of Figure 1 in AV(2002). To
check this, take for example equation (20) for VU in the main text
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cU
q(µ)
= (1 ¡ ¯)

(1 ¡aH)yUL ¡ zL¸1
+ aH
yUH ¡ zH
¸2
¸
(49)
(50)
¸1 = r + ±U + µq(µ)(1 ¡ bS)¯
¸2 = r + ±U + µq(µ)[bS +(1 ¡ bS)¯];
According to this free entry condition an increase in aH (at unchanged bS ) increases the
expected pro¯ts of unskilled jobs because yUL¡zL
r+±U+µq(µ)(1¡bS) >
yUH¡zH
r+±U+µq(µ)[bS+(1¡bS)¯ . More-
over, the denominator of the ¯rst term becomes smaller as ±(1¡bS)=±(1¡aH) < 0: However,
the denominator of the second term (¸2) decreases .The ¯rst two e®ects tend to increase VU
while the last e®ect tends to decrease VU. Hence, in order to obtain the result of AV (2002)
we need to compute the total derivative explicitly and derive its sign, to verify whether the
last e®ect is always dominated by the ¯rst two e®ects.
The di®erence between our result and AV (2002)'s is that the equivalent of ¸2 in their
model contains µq(µ)¯ in the bracketed term and, hence, is invariant to changes in bS:
However, using some straightforward but tedious calculus, it can be proved that, by di®er-
entiating (A.22) with respect to µ; a su±cient condition for ¸2 to increase when aH raises
is that the ± log µq(µ)=± log µ >± log bs=± logµ, so that that the elasticity of µq(µ) w.r.t. µ is
larger than the elasticity of bsw.r.t. µ:
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